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Abstract 
In situations of declining or depleted fish stocks, exploiters seem to have fallen prey to the 
Tragedy of the Commons, which occurs when the maximisation of short-term self-interest 
produces outcomes leaving all participants worse off than feasible alternatives would. Standard 
economic theory predicts that in social dilemmas, such as fishing from a common resource, 
individuals are not willing to cooperate and sacrifice catches in the short term, and that, 
consequently, the resource is overharvested. However, over the last decades, a multitude of 
research has shown that humans often achieve outcomes that are “better than rational” by 
building conditions where reciprocity, reputation, and trust help to overcome the temptations of 
short-term self-interest. The evolution of the natural human tendency to cooperate under certain 
conditions can be explained, and its neuro-physiological and genetic bases are being unravelled. 
Nevertheless, fisheries management still often deploys top-down regulation and economic 
incentives in its aim to regulate fisher behaviour, and under-utilizes the potential for spontaneous 
responsible fisher behaviour through setting conditions that enhance natural cooperative 
tendencies. Here I introduce this body of knowledge on how to overcome the Tragedy of the 
Commons to the audience of fisheries scientists, hoping to open up novel ways of thinking in this 
field. I do this through a series of thought experiments, based on actual published experiments, 
exploring under what conditions responsible and cooperative fisher behaviour can be expected. 
Keys include reputation-building and indirect reciprocity, face-to-face communication, 
knowledge on the state of the resource, and self-decision on rules and sanctions. 
Solon (c. 638 BC–558 BC), drawing up his laws, was laughed at for supposing that his countrymen’s greed could be 
kept within bounds by means of laws. He replied that he was framing his laws in such a way as to make it clear that it 
would be to everybody’s advantage to keep rather than to break them.  
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Introduction 
One of the objectives for fisheries management is to ensure that the fish resource is 
exploited to the level that produces the highest socioeconomic returns while at the same 
time considering conservation of the ecosystem. A task for fisheries scientists is therefore 
to estimate what that level of exploitation should be, based on research on the biology of 
the system and the impacts of the fishing activities. Although science has not been able to 
provide the ultimate answer to the question of optimal fishing activity levels, it is clear 
that in many fisheries contemporary levels are too high. Across the globe, a large number 
of important fish stocks are currently thought to be overexploited or depleted (Pauly et al. 
2002, Christensen et al. 2003, Myers and Worm 2003). In these cases, there is no conflict 
between the objectives of economic profitability and nature conservation because both 
require the reduction of contemporary levels of fishing. The problem, however, is that 
although it is clear that in the long term the reduction of fishing activity is beneficial in all 
possible ways, in the short term socioeconomic losses will be suffered. The question is 
how to distribute these losses. The dynamics of the rational exploitation of fish stocks can 
be studied by game theory (Munro 1979, Clark 1985); an excellent review of the 
application of game theory to fisheries over the last three decades is given by Bailey et al. 
(2010). 
Fisheries seem to be stuck in the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’. This phrase was coined 
by Hardin (1968), who gave the following description: 
“Picture a pasture open to all. It is to be expected that each herdsman will try to keep as 
many cattle as possible on the commons […] to maximize his gain. […] This utility has 
one negative and one positive component. The positive component is a function of the 
increment of one animal. Since the herdsman receives all the proceeds from the sale of 
the additional animal, the positive utility is nearly +1. The negative component is a 
function of the additional overgrazing created by one more animal. Since, however, the 
effects of overgrazing are shared by all the herdsmen, the negative utility for any 
particular decision-making herdsman is only a fraction of -1. Adding together the 
component partial utilities, the rational herdsman concludes that the only sensible course 
for him to pursue is to add another animal to his herd. And another; and another... But 
this is the conclusion reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. 
Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his 
herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward which all 
men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of 
the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” (Hardin 1968).  
Fishers, using an open-access common-pool resource face a similar dilemma: while they 
could jointly harvest at a rate that maximises sustainable economic returns to the group, 
they experience incentives that lead to an equilibrium of overharvesting. Phrased 
differently (Hart 1998), if individual fishers agree to limit their catch today in the 
expectation of continued future catches, they can never be sure that the catch they have 
just given up will not be immediately snapped up by competing fishers (‘dynamic 
externality’, Levhari and Mirman 1980). In addition, every caught fish not only 
constitutes the removal of that fish from the population, but also of all the potential future 
offspring that fish could have generated (Richter and van Soest in press, 2010). 
The instruments available to fisheries managers to limit the removals of fish include 
Total Allowable Catches (TACs), fishing effort restrictions, prescriptions for gear 
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characteristics, (temporal) closures of areas to fishing, etc. Fisheries management is in 
many cases a top-down bureaucratic exercise with centralized control (Daw and Gray 
2005). However, recently it is becoming apparent that central intervention from 
authorities often directly undermines existing willingness to cooperate and obey these 
rules and diminishes any stewardship motives (Bowles 2008, Richter and van Soest in 
press, 2010). Thus, a reduced sense of ‘ownership’ among fishers towards the problem 
and towards the management regulations may partly explain the reduced level of 
compliance to the regulations that is experienced (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Hatcher et 
al. 2000, Raakjær Nielsen 2003, Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003). The regulations 
are viewed by the fishers as opposing rather than supporting their interests and this 
manifests itself as a reduced compliance to ‘the letter’ as well as ‘the spirit’ of the 
regulations. Non-compliance ‘to the letter’ refers to illegal fishing activities, such as 
illegal landings or the use of illegal gear or mesh sizes, whereas non-compliance ‘to the 
spirit’ refers to attempting to find loopholes in the regulations that allow continuation of 
business as usual without reducing catches (if the reduction of fishing mortality was the 
objective of the regulation in question, as is often the case). One of the challenges of 
contemporary fisheries management is to redesign the management institutions such that 
they rebuild the ‘social capital’ among the stakeholders: the sense of stewardship and the 
natural willingness to cooperate (an excellent overview on this is given by Richter and 
van Soest in press, 2010).  
Social dilemmas, such as the Tragedy of the Commons, occur whenever individuals 
face situations in which the maximisation of short-term self-interest yields outcomes 
leaving all participants worse off than feasible alternatives would. The dilemma exists 
because at least one possible outcome yields a greater advantage for all participants, and 
the tragedy occurs if that outcome is not achieved. Standard rational economic theory 
predicts that when faced with social dilemmas individuals find it costly to contribute to 
the public good and prefer others to pay instead; and that consequently, if everyone 
follows the equilibrium strategy, the good is not provided or only underprovided 
(resulting in tragedy). However, over the last few decades a multitude of research has 
shown – in agreement with common experience – that in actual fact humans often 
achieve outcomes that are “better than rational” by building conditions where reciprocity, 
reputation, and trust can help to overcome the strong temptations of short-term self-
interest (Ostrom 1998, reviewed in a game-theoretical context by Sigmund 2010). 
Apparently, humans are not only motivated by purely immediate economic incentives, 
but also by social ones (Ostrom 1998); indeed the fear for loss of social status and 
avoidance of social conflicts are important drivers of human behaviour, and interpersonal 
conflicts have been shown to be more stressful than financial difficulties (Bolger et al. 
1989). Studies have provided insight into why and how a psychological inclination 
towards trust and social justice could have evolved and become hardwired (Fehr and 
Rockenbach 2004, Nowak and Sigmund 2005, McNamara et al. 2009, Levin 2010); the 
evolutionary roots of human altruism are evident from the fact that chimpanzees display 
similar behaviour (Warneken et al. 2007). On an abstract level, Zahavi (1975, Zahavi and 
Zahavi 1997) has pioneered the Handicap Principle, explaining the evolution of 
characteristics that appear to reduce fitness because they are costly and thus honest 
signals of quality. The hardwiring itself, namely the physiological basis of trust, 
cooperation, and generosity, is being unravelled: the neuropeptide oxytocin appears to 
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play a role (Zak et al. 2004, Kosfeld et al. 2005, Morhenn et al. 2008), and neural 
correlates in the brain have been uncovered (Rilling et al. 2002, Fehr and Rockenbach 
2004, Zak 2004, Rilling et al. 2005, Rilling et al. 2008, Zak 2008), giving birth to the 
discipline neuroeconomics (Zak 2004). The satisfaction that humans derive from 
punishing norm violations has been shown to have a neural basis (De Quervain et al. 
2004). Moreover, a genetic polymorphism in the gene AVPR1a RS3 has been found to 
correlate with individual variation in levels of trust, cooperation, and generosity (Knafo et 
al. 2008). Many experiments have shown that humans do cooperate when faced with 
social dilemmas and have investigated under what conditions levels of cooperation are 
enhanced (Ostrom 2001, Milinski et al. 2002b, Milinski et al. 2002a, Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2003, Kerr et al. 2004, Ouwerkerk et al. 2005, Milinski et al. 2006, 
Rockenbach and Milinski 2006, Milinski et al. 2008, Rockenbach and Milinski 2009). 
Conditions that increase cooperation include familiarity (Hart 1998, Hart 2003) and non-
anonymity with the possibility of direct or indirect reciprocity and reputation building 
(Milinski et al. 2002b, Milinski et al. 2002a, Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fehr and 
Rockenbach 2004, Zak et al. 2004, Nowak and Sigmund 2005), face-to-face 
communication (Ostrom 2001) and physical contact (Morhenn et al. 2008), the threat of 
punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher 2003, Fehr and Rockenbach 2004, Zak et al. 2004, 
Rockenbach and Milinski 2006, Rockenbach and Milinski 2009) or social exclusion 
(Kerr et al. 2004, Ouwerkerk et al. 2005, Spiekermann 2009). In the case where the 
public good is an open-access common-pool resource, such as the ocean fisheries, an 
increase of the number of participants is negatively related to achieving cooperation 
(Weissing and Ostrom 1991, Ostrom 2001). A recent analysis of the economic and 
biological fundamentals that influence the success of coalition formation shows that the 
larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher would be the 
relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large regional 
fisheries management organizations being stable (Pintassilgo et al. 2008). Besides group 
size, variables such as heterogeneity of participants, their dependence on the benefits 
received, their discount rates, the information available to participants, and their 
background personality types, may affect the behaviour in social dilemmas (Ostrom 
1998, Bailey et al. 2010). 
Thus, the grim and gloomy predictions of earlier theories (Olson 1965, Hardin 1968) 
that humans are stuck within economic traps has been replaced by the more optimistic 
recognition that individuals in social dilemmas face the possibility of achieving results 
that avoid the most deficient outcomes (Ostrom 2001). Policies based on the assumption 
that humans can only be lifted out of the economic trap through externally imposed 
sanctions have been subject to major failure and have exacerbated the very problems they 
were intended to ameliorate (Ostrom 1998, Bowles 2008, Richter and van Soest in press, 
2010). Field research has shown that individuals systematically engage in collective 
action to provide local public goods without an external authority to offer inducements or 
impose sanctions (Ostrom 1998). Thus, if cooperation is already hardwired in human 
nature, we just have to set the conditions in such a way that this aspect of our innate 
behaviour will be expressed. This should encourage us to investigate under exactly what 
conditions cooperative behaviour is enhanced (Sigmund 2010), and whether these 
conditions could be implemented in the context of fishery management. 
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This paper explores ways in which to incorporate such conditions in fisheries-
management settings and to bring about cooperative behaviour. I follow a series of 
experimental studies (Milinski et al. 2002b, Milinski et al. 2006, Rockenbach and 
Milinski 2006) in which behavioural scientists and economists have formally explored 
which conditions boost cooperation among people caught in the dilemma, such as non-
anonymity where behaviour is publically observable and the actors’ reputation is at stake. 
I attempt to translate the experimental settings where increased levels of cooperation 
were demonstrated, into the setting of fisheries management, albeit in a crude way. I then 
discuss the feasibility of incorporating these conditions into fisheries management 
systems. I intend this paper as a thought experiment to encourage further investigations 
into the broad area of creating the best conditions for cooperative behaviour among 
fishers. 
 
General description of the ‘public goods game’ as an experimental tool 
The ‘public goods game’ is the experimental model commonly used to study social 
dilemmas. For example, four people are each given an endowment of €5. They are then 
told that they can each choose to invest some or all of their €5 in a group project by 
putting, without discussion, an amount between €0 and €5 in an envelope. The 
experimenter will collect the contributions, total them up, double the amount, and then 
divide this money among the players, irrespective of their contribution. If all contribute 
€1, everybody receives €2 (that is, a net gain of €1). If all players but one contribute, the 
defector has a net gain of €1.50 and the contributors of €0.50 each. The prediction from 
standard rational economic theory is that no one will ever contribute anything because 
each €1 contributed yields only €0.50 to its contributor in return (corresponding to a 
relative loss of €0.50), no matter what the others do. This is a public goods problem 
because the group would be best off (taking home €10 each) if all contributed €5. But 
individual self-interest is at odds with group interest. In these experimental settings, 
however, usually people cooperate more than is predicted by standard economic theory 
(findings which are critically discussed by Kümmerli et al. 2010); nevertheless, observed 
cooperation is heterogeneous, declines quickly over time, and is often suboptimal, 
especially in sparse institutional settings (Ostrom 1998). 
 
Translation of the basic ‘public goods game’ into fisheries-management settings 
In analogy to the above, four fishers each have a quota to catch 5 fish. They are then 
told that they can each choose to invest in the rebuilding of the fish stock by refraining 
from catching an amount between 0 and 5 fish. The total of spared fish will be doubled 
and then divided among the group. 
Instead of considering up to 5 fish, it is of course more realistic to consider quantities 
in units of tonnes of fish. Or fishers can be asked to choose to refrain from catching a 
proportion of their individual quota share, or from using a proportion of their allocated 
effort. 
In the experimental setting, the experimenter has a quasi unlimited amount of money 
available that can be used to artificially double the amount contributed into the common 
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pool. It will not be possible to analogously double the amount of fish in the common 
pool. However, fortunately, fish double themselves. Any fish that is left in the pool for 
some period of time will have increased in biomass by the amount of growth minus the 
natural mortality over that period. Indeed, the dilemma of reducing fishing intensity to the 
level of maximum sustainable yield consists of fishers having to forego some yield in the 
short term while gaining more yield in the long term. For example, a typical catch of cod 
from the Irish Sea will have increased in weight by a factor 1.4 if left alone for one year 
[calculation based on natural mortality M = 0.2 and catch numbers and fish weights by 
age group averaged over 1998-2007 (ICES 2008)]. Furthermore, because large fish sell 
for a better price than small fish, these cod will have increased in value by a factor 1.6 if 
left alone for one year [based on grades by weight from Community Size Standards 
(Council Regulation [EC] No 2406/96) and average 2001-2007 prices in the Netherlands 
(Taal et al. 2008)]. Let us call this factor W (for ‘wait’); W can have a value of around 
1.5. 
The game will thus prescribe that fishers choose an amount of their quota entitlement 
and postpone using it until, e.g. next year. The next year, the total amount of catch given 
up by all fishers multiplied by W and divided by the group size will be added to the 
fisher’s ordinary quota entitlement for that year. With W = 1.5, if all four fishers sacrifice 
€1000 worth of catch, a year later they would all be allowed to add €1500 worth of catch 
to their quota; that is a net gain of €500 for each of them. If only one fisher gives up this 
year’s catch worth €1000, each of the four fishers would be allowed to add €375 worth of 
catch to their quota next year; the cooperative fisher will suffer a net loss of €625 while 
the defectors each enjoy a net gain of €375. The time period can also be made shorter, 
such that fishers are asked to postpone catching for, e.g. half a year, and having the 
amount multiplied by 0.5 * W. However, quota are usually not all caught right at the start 
of the year but distributed over the year instead, which makes it hard to decide what 
counts as a postponement of catch. Note that when the TAC and quota for the next year 
are being calculated through standard stock assessment procedures, an assumption is 
being made about the current year’s total catch. Our calculations above are valid as long 
as any catch sacrificed is not added (“returned”) to the modelled stock size. This implies 
that the non-caught fish survive in excess of the expected stock size, and that they can 
indeed be allocated as extra quota entitlement in the next year to the respective fishers in 
the group under consideration. 
I will later describe a variant of the game where the reward is not given (only) in 
terms of additional quota, but partly or wholly in terms of the general benefit of a 
progressively rebuilt stock. 
In the calculations above I ignored the economic phenomenon ‘discounting’, which 
arises from the rational preference to receive benefits today rather than tomorrow: €100 
today has higher value than €100 next year, and that is why borrowed money has to be 
paid back with interest. High uncertainty about the future results in high a discount rate, 
and this constitutes one of the fundamental problems in resource management. In our 
calculations, we could reduce the gain with a factor representing the discount rate – as 
long as its inverse is (much) smaller than W. With a discounting factor of 0.9 per year and 
W = 1.5, the perceived gain that drives the cooperation would be +0.35. 
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One more aspect that needs to be dealt with in the general description of the fishing 
game is the group size. The experimental setting of 4 people in a group may be very 
artificial. National quota are usually distributed over up to several 100 fishers. Whereas in 
the example with 4 players, a contributor would lose only €0.50 of each contributed €1 if 
the 3 others defect, the player would lose €0.99 (almost all of his contribution) if all 
others among 200 players defect. The gains if all players cooperate are not dependent on 
group size: they always double their starting amount. Thus, the rationality of cooperation 
decreases with group size. I therefore propose that the fishers be distributed over groups 
of about 4 to 6 players. Of course, if the fleet segment under consideration consists of 
only a limited number of enterprises, say <20, the game can perhaps be played in one 
group. 
In any case, in the settings corresponding to the basic public goods game not much 
cooperative behaviour is to be expected, as the fishers are caught in the Tragedy of the 
Commons. 
 
Exploring the game when reputation matters 
Theorists have shown that cooperation through indirect reciprocity can evolve 
(Nowak and Sigmund 2005). Indirect reciprocity refers to the phenomenon that 
individuals who have helped others are given support, and that supporters as well as 
helpers build up a positive reputation or image score. Experimental studies have 
confirmed that human subjects preferentially help others who have a positive image 
score. 
In the following experimental setting (Milinski et al. 2002b) the increase in 
cooperation under indirect reciprocity was measured. The description of the experiment 
and its sub-games below is taken from their article (Milinski et al. 2002b): 
General: 
“The six subjects of each group could see a public screen on which instructions and the 
actual game were projected. They were told, first, that each person had a starting 
account of DM 20 (£10) and could gain or lose money dependent on his/her and the 
participants’ decisions; second, that all decisions were anonymous and each player 
would be assigned a pseudoname (that is, a new identity) for the whole game; and last, 
that they would play in two different situations, an ‘indirect reciprocity game’ and a 
‘public goods game’.” 
Indirect reciprocity game: 
“Each person was assigned repeatedly as either a potential donor or a potential receiver. 
For example, a potential donor, say ‘Telesto’, was asked on the public screen whether he 
would give to ‘Galatea’. If Telesto decided ‘yes’, he would lose DM2.50 from his account 
and Galatea would gain DM 4 on her account. Telesto’s decision (yes or no) was 
displayed for 2 s on the public screen. Everybody knew about the contributions of all 
players, for example, whether Galatea had given in previous rounds when she had been 
playing as the potential donor or in rounds of the public goods game. The subjects also 
knew that there would be no direct reciprocity; if A was the potential donor of B, B would 
never be the potential donor of A. In each round of the indirect reciprocity game, each of 
the six players was once a potential donor and once a potential receiver.” 
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Public goods game: 
“For the public goods game, all six players were asked simultaneously whether they 
would contribute DM 2.50 to the public pool, the contents of which would then be 
doubled and redistributed evenly among all players irrespective of whether they had 
contributed. After all players had decided, each player’s decision (yes or no), his/her 
contribution (that is, DM2.50 or 0), and his/her gain (for example, DM4.17 if all but one 
had contributed), was displayed below the pseudonames for 20 s.”  
As a result, cooperation (and consequently average individual payoff) in the public goods 
games was significantly increased when they were alternated with the indirect reciprocity 
game. Over eight rounds, the probability of cooperation in the pure public goods game 
fell down from 84% to 45%, but it remained around or above 84% when these were 
alternated with the indirect reciprocity game; the average individual payoff was 1.45 
times higher in the latter situation than in the former. 
 
Translation of the game when reputation matters into fisheries-management settings 
The alternation between the two games can be translated in two fundamentally 
different ways. First, the setting of the experiment can be faithfully mimicked, such that 
fishers play in groups of, for example, six, remaining anonymous throughout the session 
through their assigned pseudonames. A session would then consist of, for example, 20 
rounds of alternating indirect reciprocity and public goods games, where fishers are asked 
to donate part of their quota to another fisher or contribute to a common pool 
respectively. The amounts contributed to the common pool will be multiplied, as before, 
by W. Donated amounts could also be multiplied by W, if the game prescribes that 
received donations can only be fished one year later. After 20 rounds, the accounts will 
be tallied; for each fisher there will be a resulting quota for this year, and an amount that 
will be added to his quota next year. 
Alternatively, the rounds of indirect reciprocity can be viewed as what happens in the 
real world as long as the public goods game is not played anonymously. The outcome of 
Milinski et al.’s (2002b) experiment indicates that people are more inclined to contribute 
to the common pool if their reputation is at stake and that people reward each other for 
their generosity. The experiment can be mimicked in a more fuzzy way, such that the 
public goods game is not interspersed with indirect reciprocity in the form of a game, but 
because of non-anonymity the indirect reciprocity is actually going on all the time in the 
real world. Because players are not anonymous here, it is expected that generous players 
will receive benefits in their local communities throughout the year and defectors may 
become social outcasts. And precisely this expectation (partly or wholly unconscious) of 
receiving favours versus becoming social outcasts operates as an incentive for them to 
contribute more generously in the public goods game. However, if only one ‘round’ of 
the public goods game is played per year (naturally interspersed by the rest of the year 
when the indirect reciprocity takes place) an individual will not be allowed quick 
adjustment of the level of cooperation in response to feedback from the effects of 
reputation. Perhaps multiple rounds per year will have to be played. Moreover, if this 
works at all, it may only work if a fishery is prosecuted by a relatively small local 
community where all fishers know each other personally and interact extensively year-
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round, in other words, where reputation is important. It may be an important prerequisite 
for this system to work that the outcomes of the public goods game are published, with 
participants’ full names, for example in the local newspaper. It is not immediately clear 
whether the public goods game should be played in small groups or not, since the indirect 
reciprocity will be ‘played’ by all fishers in one inclusive group automatically, namely in 
their community. 
In a similar experiment testing the effect of reputation and indirect reciprocity 
(Milinski et al. 2002a) it was found that persons donating in public to a well-known 
charity organization in turn received increased donations from the members of their 
group as well as enhanced political reputation (they were elected to represent the interests 
of their group). Apparently, the positive effect of generosity extends to political 
influence; moreover, it does not only work for generosity towards each other or a 
common pool of direct interest to the players, but also towards a charity from which only 
‘third parties’ benefit. The implications of the latter are important, and feature in the next 
experiment. 
 
When the ‘public good’ really is the public good 
In a further experiment Milinski et al. (2006) have demonstrated that if, in contrast to 
the standard protocol where the common pool is divided among the participants, instead, 
it is promised that the pool will be invested to encourage people in the society at large to 
reduce their fossil fuel use (through an advertisement in a national newspaper), players 
can behave altruistically. The experimenters found a nonzero basic level of altruistic 
behaviour, which was enhanced if the players were provided with expert information 
describing the state of knowledge in climate research. Analogous to the previous 
experiment, personal investments in climate protection increased substantially if social 
reputation was at stake. This increase occurred because subjects rewarded other subjects 
– in indirect reciprocity rounds – who contributed to sustaining the climate, thus 
reinforcing their altruism. Therefore, altruism could convert to net personal benefit and to 
relaxing the dilemma if the gain in reputation was large enough. Their finding that people 
rewarded contributions of others to sustaining the climate is a surprising result and 
corroborates the result discussed above (Milinski et al. 2002a) where donations to charity 
were rewarded. 
 
Translation of the game when the ‘public good’ really is the public good into 
fisheries-management settings 
The finding that people are willing to invest in a public good that is not directly given 
back to them multiplied by some factor, is an important one for our case. This implies 
that fishers may be cooperative not only if their sacrificed quota is given back to them 
multiplied by W at a later stage, but also if the only gain to the individual fisher is the 
possible gain from a rebuilt or increased stock. This is important, because if this were not 
the case the stock would not necessarily benefit from such games; after all, the fish that 
was not taken out today would be taken out tomorrow (or rather, next year). However, if 
fishers can, under the right conditions, experience an incentive to invest in the rebuilding 
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of the stock itself – a public good that is shared by all people, not just by their group of 
players – this can be used in fisheries management. In this case fishers would be willing 
to sacrifice catches for the sake of stock increase, from which they themselves and 
everybody else may benefit in an undetermined future and by an undetermined and 
uncertain amount. 
Consider the experimental setup as described by Milinski et al. (2006) in which the 
public goods game is alternated with an indirect reciprocity game in a total of 20 rounds 
with anonymous players using pseudonames. Instead of the promise to publish a press 
advertisement warning about climate change (as in Milinski et al, 2006), in the fisheries 
context the benefit would be the likely increase of the stock. To illustrate, for the Celtic 
Sea cod stock (ICES Division VIIe-k) a TAC of 2600 t was advised for 2009, which was 
predicted to bring the spawning stock biomass in the next year to 8800 t (ICES 2008). If 
10% of that TAC would be given up completely, these fish would grow and be subject to 
natural mortality and thereby increase in biomass by a factor W = 1.4 to 363 t resulting in 
an increase in predicted stock biomass of 4%. Alternatively, if the 10% was not given up 
but only postponed for one year, then the 260 t would be added to the TAC for the next 
year, and only a net gain of 103 t would be added to the stock biomass. This would mean 
there had only been a 1% increase in the predicted stock biomass. 
One could envisage establishing a mixture of rewarding the fishers with some extra 
quota for next year combined with the more abstract reward of stock growth. Then the 
fishers’ incentive to postpone some of this year’s catch is partially a ‘direct’ gain (a 
known increase in quota, albeit postponed to next year) and partially an ‘indirect’ gain 
through stock growth. The net gain of the 103 t could, for example, be ‘split’ between 
extra quota and the stock in a ratio of 1 to 9; in this case fishers would experience a quota 
increase of 4% (discount rate ignored) and the stock biomass prediction would still 
benefit from a 1% increase. Note that even an only 1% benefit is probably more than the 
reduction in society’s fossil fuel use one can expect to result from a newspaper 
advertisement as in the experiment (Milinski et al. 2006). Nevertheless, future states of 
fish stocks as well as catches are notoriously difficult to predict, and such uncertainty 
results in a high perceived discount rate. One of the (many) reasons fishers do not favour 
conservation plans, even if their long term benefits appear to increase, is that stock/catch 
predictions are often wrong. So even if it is predicted that by taking less today all fishers 
will benefit tomorrow, fishers know this will not necessarily happen.  
An interesting result of the experiment by Milinski et al. (2006) is furthermore, that 
altruistic behaviour was enhanced if the players were provided with expert information 
describing the state of knowledge in climate research. This can be translated in various 
ways. First, it may be important to inform the fishers on their expected gains from 
projected stock growth (as in the calculations given above). But going a bit further, it may 
be important to inform the fishers about the ecosystem impact of fishing or even expose 
them to a movie documentary about global overfishing, such as the film The End of the 
Line by Rupert Murray that was released in 2009 (after the book with the same title, 
Clover 2006). 
 
The interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment 
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Various public goods studies have investigated the effect of the possibility of 
punishment on the level of cooperation (e.g., Fehr and Gächter 2002). For example, when 
players are allowed to punish defectors by reducing the defector’s income at their own 
cost—let’s say, by investing €1 to reduce another player’s income by €3—defectors have 
been found to typically increase their contributions in future rounds, even with new 
partners. Such altruistic but costly punishment leads to a large increase in cooperation, 
but induces another type of dilemma, namely, that it considerably destroys monetary 
gains: both the punisher and the punished lose money. Especially in the early rounds, 
when punishment is heavily used, realized payoff is lower than in the absence of the 
punishment option. Not until cooperation has been established on a stable level is a 
significantly higher general payoff achieved under altruistic punishment. Thus, the group 
would be better off if contributions to the public good could be induced by a less 
destructive means. And in fact, the withholding of support in the indirect reciprocity 
game can be seen as such a less destructive form of ‘punishment’. Withholding donations 
does not cost anything but the ‘punisher’ actually saves money or resources by not 
donating to a defector (who does not lose his money either; instead, he does not receive 
additional gains). 
In a complicated experimental design, however, Rockenbach and Milinski (2006) 
found that, although subjects could choose a punishment-free environment where 
reputation building alone would allow for high levels of cooperation, the great majority 
chose the environment where a costly punishment option was available in addition to 
reputation building. In the experiment, 20 rounds were played that each consisted of a 
public goods game, followed by the option of costly punishment if that environment was 
chosen, followed by an indirect reciprocity game (or not, in a control treatment). Not only 
did the participants prefer to have the option of costly punishment available despite the 
fact that cheap reputation building alone could ‘do the job’, but they also reached very 
high levels of persistent cooperation as well as very high net payoff in that situation. 
Compared to the control treatment of only punishment without indirect reciprocity, the 
number of punishment acts was greatly reduced (thus saving costs to everybody and 
largely removing the added dilemma of costly punishment) while at the same time the 
less numerous free-riders were punished more heavily. Free-riders were effectively hit 
twice: they were punished directly by the removal of money from their account and they 
were damaged indirectly by being withheld donations. These strong incentives to 
cooperate induced not only the majority of subjects but even the worst free-riders to be 
more cooperative when punishment was combined with reputation building. The 
interaction between punishment and reputation building thus boosted cooperative 
efficiency. 
 
Translation of the game where indirect reciprocity and costly punishment interact 
into fisheries-management settings 
Apparently, groups of human beings prefer to have the option available to punish 
members who violate the social norm, not only by withholding social favours but also 
through direct costly punishment. If, as before, fishers would be allowed to monitor each 
others’ contributions the option to punish defectors could be added. Until now, I 
translated the money contributions of the experimental game into sacrificed or postponed 
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quota shares. The exchange of donations in the indirect reciprocity game was equated 
either, quite artificially, to the exchange of quota shares between fishers known by 
pseudonames, or to the exchange of social favours in the local communities where the 
fishers live. In a strict analogy to the current experiment, a punisher would give up some 
quota and the punished would have to reduce his quota by a larger amount, in rounds 
played under pseudonames. Although such settings may be stretching the analogy a bit 
too far, the concept that punishment is not a monetary fine but instead a reduction of the 
individual quota of the defector is worthwhile consideration. Groups of fishers could be 
envisaged who meet and negotiate to reach a voluntary and mutual agreement about 
individual quota allocations with the collective aim to postpone and/or sacrifice part of 
their quota for the sake of rebuilding the stock. In these negotiations, fishers would meet 
non-anonymously and they would be able to punish non-cooperative members by 
allocating smaller quota shares to them; in addition, these non-cooperative members 
would experience more subtle social damage in their local community. However, unless 
the game is artificially mimicked, it is hard to see how punishment, either by monetary 
fines or by reductions of quota, can be set up to be costly for the individual punisher, 
because the administrative costs of punishment would more logically be shared by the 
group or the society at large (resulting in a different type of ‘game’). In the experiments, 
costly punishment is meant to reflect the fact that punishment is usually costly to the 
individual punisher: it demands time and energy, and often entails some risk (Sigmund 
2010). 
The conclusion from this experiment for our purposes seems to be that people prefer a 
setting where punishment of non-cooperative peers is possible, perhaps satisfying a 
deeply rooted sense of fairness. In combination with non-anonymity and reputation 
building, this will increase the incentives to responsibly restrain fishing activity. 
 
Discussion 
I do not pretend to have solutions that prescribe in detail how fisheries management 
should incorporate the ideas developed here. A single best management instrument does 
not exist (Degnbol et al. 2006, Ostrom et al. 2007). The experiments that I discussed 
were of course not meant to prescribe policy, but rather to investigate incentives for 
human cooperation. Likewise, I do not intend to prescribe settings in fisheries 
management according to the ‘translations’ of these experiments. My contribution is 
therefore not so much the presentation of a new and magic policy strategy, but an 
introduction of existing knowledge to a different audience in a playful and thought-
provoking way. The knowledge I presented has until now not been widely discussed and 
commonly shared in the community of fisheries scientists and fisheries managers (but see 
Eikeset et al. in press, 2010), although game theoretical analyses have a long history in 
fisheries science (Bailey et al. 2010). I hope to contribute to closing that gap in a 
complementary way and open up this field of knowledge to that community and 
encourage debate, inspire research in new directions, and offer novel perspectives on 
policy design for fisheries management (Degnbol et al. 2006).  
The artificial experimental settings of the laboratory studies discussed here may raise 
some concerns. For example, volunteers were recruited from among students. First of all, 
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if the variation in pro-social behaviour – be it genetic (Knafo et al. 2008) or caused by 
variation in social background – is not randomly distributed, it may not necessarily be the 
case that fishers reach the same level of cooperation as students do. The subset of 
volunteering students may also be a biased sample regarding pro-social tendencies; after 
all, to volunteer in an experiment constitutes the provisioning to a common good. 
Furthermore, although the student participants can take home real money, the amounts 
are small and the experiment may be perceived as ‘only a game’; and in any case the 
participants were not asked to sacrifice their own money but instead they were asked to 
invest money that they were given by the experimenter. It can be argued that fishers will 
be much more reluctant to put their actual catches, their livelihood, at stake. Moreover, 
the fishers will differ in their assets, resources, stakes, and benefits, and it has not been 
addressed here how that would affect the outcomes (the influence of such differences has 
been discussed in Ostrom 2001). Another concern is that the experiments were artificial 
in how they treated ‘non-anonymity’. Even in ‘non-anonymous’ rounds, the participants’ 
real identity was never revealed to the other participants; only the pseudonames were 
known, and these played a role only within the game but not in the ‘real world’. It may be 
questioned whether levels of pro-social behaviour would be different if the real identities 
of those involved would be public. Although these are valid concerns, I need to point out 
that the merit of such experiments is not that they measure actual levels of pro-social 
behaviour, but rather investigate what factors affect those levels in a relative sense. The 
underlying assumption is then that these factors influence human behaviour at a basic 
psychological or even biological level and that this would hold true under more realistic 
conditions. This assumption would be affected only if these factors interacted in a major 
way with factors that play a role in real-life situations. 
I did not discuss any experiments that tested the effect of face-to-face communication 
between rounds, enabling participants to discuss what they all should do and build norms 
to encourage conformance (Nash 1953, Ostrom 1998, Ostrom 2001, Ostrom 2007). 
According to Ostrom’s (1998) review the effect is large; in fact, no other variable has as 
large and consistent an effect on results as face-to-face communication. A strong 
recommendation for the design of governance based on industry involvement is therefore 
that the communication should actually happen in physical meetings with face-to-face 
interaction. At the psychology level, the reasons for this effect include communication of 
mutual commitment, increasing trust, creating and reinforcing norms, and developing a 
group identity. The face-to-face situation probably also adds additional values to the 
subjective payoff structure, as the opportunity for reputation-building may be more 
strongly felt. The effect of face-to-face communication is quite likely deeply rooted and 
hardwired in our biology; in experiments monetary sacrifice among strangers has been 
found to be mediated by endogenous oxytocin release after physical contact (Morhenn et 
al. 2008). A reluctance to betray trust and behave selfishly when being watched may be 
hardwired in humans as well (Milinski and Rockenbach 2007). Apparently, human beings 
take into account sophisticated signs of others watching: “don’t lose your reputation” 
(Fehr 2004) is an unconscious imperative that guides social behaviour.  
When stating that pro-social behaviour is hardwired, I do not mean that particular 
rules for reciprocity or trust are hardwired in our brains and inherited as such; the 
situation is more subtle. It is our emotional sensitivity towards social rewards and 
penalties as well as justness and fairness that is inherited and has evolved because it has 
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the potential to elevate the likelihood of cooperation, which in turn enhances biological 
fitness (Sigmund 2010). For example, the satisfaction that humans derive from punishing 
norm violations has been shown to have a neural basis (De Quervain et al. 2004). A 
reputation for being trustworthy, or for using retribution against those who do not keep 
their agreements or keep up their fair share, becomes a valuable asset. In an evolutionary 
context, it increases fitness in an environment in which others also use reciprocity norms 
(McNamara et al. 2009, Sigmund 2010). Similarly, developing trust in an environment in 
which others are trustworthy is an asset. Hence, our sensitivity for learning social norms 
that increase our own long-term benefits when confronting social dilemmas with others 
who have learned similar norms, has evolved and become hardwired. Similarly, our 
language instinct is hardwired, notwithstanding the fact that no grammar rules or 
vocabulary of any particular language are transmitted through our genes (Pinker 1995). 
Similar to the case of language, given our innate sensitivity for social behaviour, we need 
to be socialized by parents, peers, teachers, business partners, and society at large for the 
appropriate behaviour to develop and be expressed. There is no contradiction between 
asserting that pro-social behaviour is innate and that it is learned. The genetic variation as 
well as variation in social background leads to variable expression of pro-social 
behaviour. In turn, variation may play a role in the evolution of the personality 
differences observed (McNamara et al. 2009, Sigmund 2010). 
I focussed on very artificial experimental settings revealing conditions that enhance 
pro-social behaviour under controlled environments. However, in addition, extensive 
empirical field studies have found that the users of natural resources sometimes, but not 
always, invest in designing and implementing governance systems in order to increase the 
likelihood of sustaining them. Ostrom (2009) has reviewed these studies and provides an 
analysis of factors conducive to collective action in real-world examples. Ostrom’s 
results have already been used for analyses of existing fisheries management systems 
(Eikeset et al. in press, 2010). That was not my aim; I chose to look at factors that 
promote pro-social behaviour at the most basic level of human expression. From the 
experiments I reviewed it is possible to distil basic properties of human nature under 
controlled conditions, bared from the complexities of multi-level interactions of factors in 
real-world case studies. Nevertheless, some results from Ostrom’s (2009) analysis that 
are worth mentioning here are that, on the down-side, the large resource-size of high-sea 
fisheries, the large uncertainty in knowledge of the state of the resource, and the mobility 
of fish, are all non-conducive to pro-social collective action; and these variables are 
unfortunately not under our control. On the positive side, when users share common 
knowledge of the system and how their actions affect each other, and when users have 
full autonomy at the collective-choice level to craft and enforce some of their own rules, 
and when users are dependent on the resource for a substantial portion of their 
livelihoods, pro-social collective action is more likely. 
An illustrative example of self-organized fishing rules is given by Hart (Hart 1998, 
Hart 2003) in his description of the mixed fishery for crabs and demersal fish off south 
Devon, UK. Edible crab (Cancer pagurus, Cancridae) are caught with pots that are set in 
strings of about 60 pots each and left on the bottom year round. Each crab fisher has a 
defined territory where up to 600 pots are set. Demersal fish are caught by trawls, which 
can cause expensive damage to crab pots if the two should become entangled. In the late 
1970s, conflict between crabbers and trawlers caused by gear interference had escalated. 
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It led to the partitioning of the fishing ground, within the national 6-mile limit, into 
crabbing-only areas and areas where both crabbing and trawling could take place for all 
or some of the year. The partitioning was based on a voluntary agreement between the 
parties and has remained in force and working since its inception. The agreement is most 
threatened by large-beam trawlers (~30 m) and scallop dredgers originating from outside 
the group that exploit the inshore area. Hart (2003) analysed why this voluntary 
agreement works, so that the system might serve as a model for rulemaking where similar 
conflicts of interest exist. The participants in the fishery are either related or know each 
other well. Many live together in the same small communities, and most come from 
families for whom fishing has been a livelihood for centuries (see references in Hart 
1998). In addition to achieving the goal of keeping conflicting gears apart, the system has 
resulted in a conservation effect for organisms that are damaged by towed gear, because 
some areas have been closed to trawling for more than 20 years. 
Central intervention from authorities often directly undermines existing pro-social 
behaviour (Bowles 2008, Richter and van Soest in press, 2010). It should be carefully 
considered whether or not financial sanctions are implemented. The human tendency to 
cooperate may actually decline under an institutional regime of economic incentives for 
cooperation, for example because these incentives remove the possibility for people to 
signal their good behaviour to their social peers and build a good reputation (Bowles 
2008, Richter and van Soest in press, 2010). Another reason for a decline of cooperation 
under an institutional regime of economic incentives may be that people feel they can 
‘buy the right’ to be non-cooperative through paying the fine or fee (Bowles 2008, 
Richter and van Soest in press, 2010); they buy the right to overexploit the common 
resource. Similarly, the market for carbon-emission permits might be perceived as a trade 
in the rights to pollute the world. In experiments and in the field it has been found that 
sometimes financial incentives induced more self-interested behaviour, even after they 
were withdrawn (Bowles 2008). An example where formal rules destroyed informal 
norms is provided by Cardenas et al. (2000). In this study experiments were run with 
people in rural Colombia who are confronted with a common pool problem in their daily 
life. In the experiment subjects were asked to decide how much timber to extract from a 
forest. The scenario presented was that harvesting had an adverse effect on water quality 
(as is actually the case in the study region), posing a cost on everyone in the group. The 
game was played first without any regulations in place, while at a later stage an extraction 
norm was introduced that was enforced by a mild probabilistic fine. Cardenas et al. 
(2000) found that subjects reduced their extraction level immediately after the regulation 
was introduced, but started extracting more aggressively after realizing that consequences 
were rather mild. Strikingly, in the last rounds, extraction levels were higher with the 
regulation than without. As a result, payoffs were significantly lower when individuals 
were confronted with a formal rule than in its absence; the weak official rule interacted 
with the internal norms of the subjects and destroyed their intrinsic motivation to 
cooperate. However, from such results it cannot simply be concluded that regulations 
should be abolished. The loss of social capital may, to a high extent, be irreversible 
(Bowles 2008, Richter and van Soest in press, 2010).  
Also too much monitoring may have the counterintuitive result that individuals feel 
they are not trusted and thus become less trustworthy; they may assume that formal 
organizations are charged with the responsibility of taking care of joint needs and that 
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reciprocity is no longer needed (Ostrom 1998). Importantly, while economic incentives, 
such as fines, tend to diminish any existing social capital when they are imposed 
externally, the opposite seems to be the case when they are imposed from within, by 
peers (Bowles 2008). This also became apparent from the experiment discussed above 
(Rockenbach and Milinski 2006), where peer punishment combined with reputation 
building was the preferred setting and proved to be a very effective incentive for 
cooperation. Furthermore, experiments have revealed that if the participants are given the 
opportunity to vote whether the institution is allowed to keep the fine revenues, 
cooperation is enhanced (Vyrastekova and van Soest 2008, Richter and van Soest in 
press, 2010). The authors believe that the casting of votes served as a means of 
communication between the participants as to their views on the urgency of conserving 
the common resource and their willingness to cooperate towards that aim. Translated to 
the fisheries management context that would imply that even if managers believe it is 
desirable to keep institutional sanctioning, it may be important to involve the stakeholders 
in decision-making, for example on the level of sanctioning. Or the stakeholders 
themselves could institutionalize financial sanctions from within through their Producer 
Organisations. Most robust and long-lasting common-pool regimes involve clear 
mechanisms for monitoring and graduated sanctions for enforcing compliance, and few 
self-organized regimes rely entirely on communication alone to sustain cooperation in 
situations that generate strong temptations to break mutual commitments (Ostrom 1998). 
Monitors – who may be participants themselves – do not use strong sanctions for 
individuals who rarely break rules. Modest sanctions indicate to rule breakers that their 
lack of conformance has been observed by others. By paying a modest fine, they rejoin 
the community in good standing and learn that rule infractions are observed and 
sanctioned. Repeated rule breakers are more severely sanctioned and eventually excluded 
from the group. Rules meeting these design principles reinforce contingent commitments 
and enhance the trust participants have that others are also keeping their commitments 
(Ostrom 1998). 
Many fisheries industries in Western states have experienced a shift from government 
to governance over the last decade (van Hoof 2010), characterised by a trend towards 
decentralised, flexible and consensual styles of governance, at the expense of top-down, 
centralised, hierarchical, command-and-control regulation. In the European Union for 
example, The Common Fisheries Policy reform in 2002 had already started a process of 
strengthened participation in fisheries governance; and the recently released Green Paper 
on the CFP  (Anonymous 2009) further explores avenues to increase participatory 
decision-making. According to this Green Paper, the general framework for fisheries 
policy would be set on the basis of a Commission proposal, but detailed implementation 
decisions could be taken at a regional level through a process of stakeholder interaction. 
It also foresees requests to industry to develop their own fisheries plans. Apparently, 
governments and the sector increasingly recognised that a fishing industry cannot be 
managed effectively without the cooperation and participation of fishers to formulate 
policy and to implement and enforce laws and regulations.  
The institutional characteristics that would likely maintain existing social capital 
(Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Hatcher et al. 2000, Raakjær Nielsen 2003, Raakjær Nielsen 
and Mathiesen 2003, van Hoof 2010, Richter and van Soest in press, 2010) include the 
extent to which the external intervention is perceived to be legitimate and adequate (or 
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proportional), as well as the extent to which the institution is perceived to be supportive 
(rather than restrictive). When an institution is perceived to be legitimate and fair, 
participants are much more inclined to obey the rules. A study among Danish fishers 
(Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003) reported that they “feel they are taken hostage by 
an illegitimate management system, and thus feel it is morally correct not to comply”. 
One way to achieve legitimacy is involving stakeholders in the process of designing 
formal institutions (Hatcher et al. 2000, Dankel 2009, Eikeset et al. in press, 2010). An 
active dialogue between stakeholders and decision makers can also help identify and 
overcome potentially conflicting objectives from different stakeholders (Dankel 2009). A 
larger involvement of fishers in the decision-making process should also include the 
transmission of knowledge to the fishers concerning the status of the stocks (Raakjær 
Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003); this agrees with the findings that participants in common 
pool experiments tend to contribute more when information on the common-pool 
problem is provided (Milinski et al. 2006). It has also been found that biological 
characteristics of the stock, such as intrinsic growth rate and stock size, can have 
important influence on the fishers’ cooperation (Trisak 2005). However, users’ discount 
rates can also affect the outcome (Munro 1979). Compliance with fisheries regulations 
has been found to depend not only on economic incentives and the perceived 
meaningfulness of the regulation, but also on ethical views and mutual trust among the 
fishers to comply (Kuperan and Sutinen 1998, Hatcher et al. 2000, Raakjær Nielsen and 
Mathiesen 2003). Fishers may build a good local reputation when their behaviour signals 
responsible fishing. However, under certain conditions, non-compliance may become the 
social norm (Raakjær Nielsen and Mathiesen 2003, Kerr et al. 2004). 
The Dutch system of individual transferable quota (ITQ) has been described as a 
change to partial co-management to show how this increased compliance and reduced 
costs to society (van Hoof 2010). Since almost two decades Dutch beam-trawl fishers are 
members of local quota-management groups. Within these groups, fishers pool their 
individual quota, enabling them to buy, sell, or lease quota, increasing their short-term 
flexibility. The introduction of this system clearly played a role in bringing back 
legitimacy to the system and in increasing compliance with quota management. Official 
landings have been within the set TACs and the costs of the inspection service and 
registered infringements have been greatly reduced (van Hoof 2010). Also there was a 
shift in the driver for compliance, from an economic rationale (based on the economic 
gain obtained from violating the regulation relative to the likelihood of detection and the 
severity of the sanction) towards social control, peer pressure, and a social normative 
rationale (van Hoof 2010). Nevertheless, the groups are reluctant to police their 
operations among themselves and they still look at the government as an agent to fulfil a 
role in enforcement (van Hoof 2010). 
It appears that approaches based on the social sciences to achieve specific behavioural 
goals for a social good are being used to tackle real problems of fisheries management. A 
recent project (“Project 50%”, A. Revill, personal communication, 
http://www.cefas.co.uk/data/fishing-gear-technology-at-cefas.aspx), aimed at reducing 
discards (non-landed catch) of fish in the English beam-trawl fishery in the Western 
Channel, successfully produced a desirable behavioural change of the fishermen. Fishers 
participating on a voluntary basis (without financial compensation) were asked to design 
a selective trawl which they believed would reduce discards, without any further 
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prescription. The study would pay for the designed trawls to be produced. Newsletters 
were distributed to raise public awareness of the trials and the positive steps the fishers 
were taking to reduce discards; the participating skippers are non-anonymous. When the 
experimental beam trawlers fished with a standard trawl on one side and the modified 
trawl of the fishers’ own design on the other side of the vessel, most designs indeed 
resulted in reduced discards and catches. More importantly, the fishers are willing to use 
these trawls in the future, despite the fact that catches are likely lower. Essential for the 
resulting behavioural change is that the fishers were given the freedom to use their own 
expert judgement on the characteristics of the trawl in order to reach the preset objective. 
 
Conclusions and outlook/recommendations 
The most important conclusion from this study is that small differences in 
institutional design may lead to very different outcomes in terms of cooperative fisher 
behaviour to overcome the Tragedy of the Commons. Human nature displays both self-
interest and altruism, depending on external conditions, which can be manipulated. Thus, 
self-interested cynical people may become responsible moral agents under the right 
conditions. Settings that enhance these desirable outcomes include (i) non-anonymity – 
fishers’ individual choices should be publicly known among them and/or in their wider 
social community; (ii) provision of knowledge to fishers on the state of the resource and 
the urgency and impact of their responsible behaviour; (iii) fishers’ self-decision on rules 
and (levels of) economic sanctions; (iv) face-to-face communication among fishers and 
between fishers and managers and other stakeholders. 
One dogma that may have to be abolished is that fisheries data at the individual vessel 
level are often strictly confidential. This suggestion follows from the findings that in 
order to maintain high levels of cooperation, it appears to be important to avail of the 
opportunity to acquire information on each other’s intentions and to monitor each other’s 
actual contributions, because this is required for reputation building and for the (social) 
rewarding or punishing of each other’s behaviour. In the current situation, where 
individual vessel-based fisheries data are confidential, one such opportunity for 
monitoring each other’s level of pro-social behaviour is absent. 
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